Deep Dive: A Study on Gaza
Published: May 13, 2024
Revised: July 31, 2024
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Pre-face
This publication was written on May 13th 2024, and has been revised on Wednesday 31st July 2024 for the purposes of re-publishing for Woven. This means that, whilst I have done everything I can to make sure that information is up to date, there may still be some inaccuracies. Writing and publishing is something I do in my free time, so I do not update content regularly nor can I cover for any laws or rulings that become obsolete.
Furthermore, this is a condensed essay. I cannot possibly cover all of the situation in Gaza within such a short word count, nor can I pay a great deal of attention to the October 7th Hamas-led attack on Israel. Although this has been outlined in the timeline overview of the conflict, it does not factor into my evaluation of the Genocide Convention. Simply put, if the ICJ were to investigate a country over allegations of war crimes, it would determine this based on specific actions committed by the accused country. This would not include weighing such actions against other acts of violence or conflict.
The Hamas-led attack on October 7th, while significant in understanding the broader context and potentially the motivations of involved parties, would not serve as direct mitigation for actions that meet the legal criteria of genocide. Instead, it might be considered in understanding the situation's complexity and contextuality, however, this would not alter the legal assessment of whether genocide, as strictly defined by the Convention, has occurred.
You will find this essay to largely, if not completely, centre upon the situation in Gaza. This means it does not cover the events that have occurred in Israel, and even so, it can not possibly cover the events in Gaza in their entirety. I can make no guarantee, warranty, or representation, express or implied, as to the validity, reliability, or completeness of the information contained in it. I can not be liable for any errors or omissions in this information nor for the availability of this information.
Finally, this essay serves three specific purposes, namely:
To provide an introduction to geopolitics concerning the Gaza strip
To offer a basic evaluation of the matter and an application to the Convention
To outline a basic timeline of historical events leading up to the conflict
It does not serve:
To act as legal advice (I am literally just a law student - do not use my content as an authority in any way please)
To reflect my opinions on the matter
To act as a formal essay or journalistic publication of any kind - this is the least formal “essay” I have ever written, simply because I want to make the information in it as accessible as possible.
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Borders are not limited to state borders.
Bordering is not contingent upon territorial zones. They can be built up, and rebuilt within states, beyond state lines, and across international communities. Usually, this doesn’t pose as an issue with neighbouring countries which are party to trade agreements and trade unions, and share similar diplomatic and governmental ideology.
The EU has the ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy) to outline the laws of access contingent upon the hierarchies of states within that area.
So whats the issue with Palestine?
Israel and Palestine have completely opposing organisational and diplomatic ideology, and have continued in a dynamic lasting nearly 100 years of being sworn enemies. This goes all the way back to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and British withdrawal from these territories.
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Volatility and The Involvement of the West
Though the war has clearly indicated a rapidly destabilising Middle East, what this means for the rest of the World in a time of increased and unprecedented globalisation is unknown. Russias involvement in welcoming Hamas officials to Moscow also points fingers at issues regarding neutrality of large powers.
Since the war began, aid for Palestine from the EU has changed by the day, from quick withdrawals to urgent humanitarian efforts in direct response to deaths and Palestinian losses.
Increase in pro-Palestinian sentiment alongside escalating humanitarian concerns could lead to strained relationships between allies and within civil societies.
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The Genocide Convention and Gaza
The Genocide Convention, and its application within the International Criminal Courts, provides us with the following definition:
Element 1: Nature of Atrocities - killing, serious harm, destruction, displacement
– killing[1] (this may be “intentional, but not necessarily premeditated”)[2]; “serious harm” (both physically and mentally);[3]intentional imposition of measures that destroy the group “in whole or in part”,[4] and displacement[5] or prevention of the births[6] of children. It must also be noted that these atrocities are not contingent upon the presence of active conflict.[7]
Element 2: “A national, ethnical, racial or religious group”.[8]
Element 3: Several individuals/organisations involved; and a formed pattern.[9]
Element 4: Mens Rea
This may be separated into both the “dolus”[1] (defined by Article 30 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court as knowledgeable and educated intent)[2] and the avaricious element of aiming to annihilate the group.[3] This mental component must be shared by all members operating the genocide,[4] though need not be to the same severity for each individual – this is contingent upon their involvement within the execution.[5]
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Meeting the four elements:
The history of the State of Palestine is entrenched in decades of Western occupation,[6] yet the fact remains that the Palestinians do not fit under the definition of ethnicity; this is only satisfied in the cases of immigrants.[7] Palestine is, instead, a nation, and it is argued that this has been the case until the Israelis interfered and “uprooted”[8] them. There is continued debate on the validity of the nation,[9] but since it can be affirmed that the Palestinians are an indigenous group,[10] the first element is satisfied.
To date, since the outbreak of the war on October 7th, there have been approximately 39,006 reported killings of Palestinians in Gaza – many of whom are women are children.[11] Millions of Gaza’s population have been displaced.[12] Israeli forces have disconnected the strip from electricity,[13] and blocked off their water desalination plant to Gaza.[14] Palestinians are relying on humanitarian responses to access food, water, basic hygiene equipment and shelter. Israeli forces are aware of the ongoing deaths of civilians, with the use of white phosphorous in populated areas of Gaza[15] highlighting the deliberate and clear attempt of wiping out mass numbers of Palestinians. The case to satisfy the second element is strong.
There can be no real political or economic intention to gain even more holy land since Israel has occupied East Jerusalem since 1967.[16]
Finance Minister of Israel, Bezalel Smotrich, allegedly accused Human Rights Organisations of being a “threat” to Israel.[17] This perceived threat is arguably a façade to the Zionistic and annihilistic sentiment shared by those in power - the Israeli military has a far superior standing than that of their opposition and faces no genuine threat to annihilation of their population.[18] Previous important figures within the Israeli Government have conceded the use of “false-alarms”[19] to garner more artillery.
Furthermore, the investigation into unit Duvdevan found that the unit was responsible for “targeted killings”,[20] which the Israeli Government refuses to inquire into “because it would become a criminal investigation”.[21]
There must be specific intent to achieve the annihilation of the group and any personal motive of economic or political gain “does not exclude the perpetrator's specific intent”.[22] When it comes to the people involved in its execution, even low-level players are guilty if they knowingly act under genocidal leadership. [23]
There are key authoritative figures in the state of Israel with clear genocidal intent. Furthermore, those on lower-level operational orders appear to be aware of this intent, as demonstrated by the silenced investigations and bids to increase military equipment without genuine reasoning. It cannot be comprehended that a state would act in such a way solely out of perceived threat when frankly, such a threat that Hamas may pose is relatively minimal in comparison.
By this evaluation, the evidence presented against the actions reportedly committed by Israel upon Gaza is strong, and likely satisfies the defining elements of the Genocide Convention.
ADDRESSING REBUTTAL:
David Preston argued that the Palestinian population has grown over the decades,[1] and the primary reasoning behind the attacks is to destroy Hamas – not the people.[2] He further noted that Gazans were “warned”[3]. Evacuation leaflets are dropped at short notice, Palestinians are cornered and have essentially no where to go in sufficient time.
Far less loss of life has been needed to satisfy the criteria for genocidal intent. For example, the case of Kristć held the destruction of residential and religious infrastructure to constitute genocidal intent.[5] Furthermore, in Seromba, the mere awareness of innocents still residing within bombed areas satisfied this element.[6] It must be understood that, whilst many Jews and Israelis do not share the genocidal agenda of the Israeli state, individuals have been convicted for far less in the past concerning genocide.
A Timeline overview of the Conflict
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UN Resolution 181
1947
Arab and Jewish state separation with the internationalisation of Jerusalem to address the conflict between Palestinian Nationalism and Jewish Nationalism (Zionism)
The 6-day war
1967
East Jerusalem is annexed by Israel. Israel gained military control over West Bank, Gaza Strip, Old City of Jerusalem and Golan Heights. This war has its origins in the results of state control of the Suez Canal.
Resolution 681
1990
This attempted to establish protections for Palestinians during times of war, but was to no avail
OSLO II
1990
The West Bank is divided into three zones.
The beginning of the construction of visible and invisible borders, with those borders being approved by Israel - the occupying power of West Bank at this point. Freedom of movement becomes better for Israelis, and worse for Palestinians. This raises issues with Article 4 of the Geneva Convention. Israel is accused of forcible displacement of Palestinian citizens...
Area A: 17.1%
PA given full responsibility
for civilian and security control.
Area B: 21.3%
PA given civilian control;
Israel given security control.
Area C: 61%
Israel has full control.
Israel could now build infrastructure in its occupied areas. Israel closed off zones within these areas for military occupation, built infrastructure for military purposes and bulldozed Palestinian towns and villages to make up space for military occupation. This was not in accordance with Article 4 of the Geneva Convention.
The EU tried to help by building and funding institutions in occupied Palestinian territory, yet despite these efforts, Palestinian force resources were limited and there was hardly even an effective national Palestinian police force. It was difficult for Palestinians to have any civil control in Israeli-occupied areas B and C because the Israelis were in control of how many police stations there could be. Organisational flaws in the Palestinian civil police force.
Israel declares approximately 18% of the West Bank as closed military zones, some of which is private Palestinian land.
2nd Intifada
Jerusalem, 2000
Israel bombed most of the infrastructure built by the EU projects in the second intifada. Further violence with 141 Palestinians killed, and 12 Israelis killed. The UN Assembly demanded that the Israeli built Jerusalem barrier be demolished.
Inbetween Times
Early 2000s
2004: ICJ rules portions of the Israeli West Bank OPT’s to be illegal.
Israel closes Area B PCP stations until 2008 following intifada
Hamas
Early 2000s
Hamas successful in Palestine elections, take over Gaza Strip in 2007. Consequently, the EU and International Community boycott the Palestinian Government.
Independent International Commission Inquiry
2022
Saw that 14 illegal Jewish Settlements were established in East Jerusalem; with restrictive planning and zoning regimes, pushing out Palestinian families.
The International Community
2022
The international community is represented by the UN General Assembly, insofar as its involvement within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Over the years, involvement has changed towards each country.
Israel is not a member of NATO but was fully supported by its member countries of its war against Palestine and Hamas. It was given place of the NATO parliamentary assembly, and extended bilateral relations with EU countries.
2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel
October 7th 2023
Hamas launched a coordinated attack on Israel, involving rocket fire and incursions across the border, resulting in significant casualties and damage, and marking a major escalation in the ongoing conflict. 1,139 people were killed by the attackers, many being civilians at the Re’im (Nova) Music Festival.
How to Help
Learn about the conflict through these Instagram pages:
@eye.on.palestine
@wizard_bisan1
@healthworkers4palestine
@palestinesolidarityuk
@unispal
Donate whatever you can to any of the following charities:
MAP
UN Crisis Relief
UNFPA
ICRC
MSF, Doctors Without Borders
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Citations
The above essay utilised the following links, articles and reports throughout, which have been listed below:
Chapter: Borders -
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650045.2018.1552946#abstract
Chapter: The Genocide Convention and Gaza -
1] United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, s 2(a)
[2] Textbook Robert Cryer, Darryl Robinson, Sergey Vasiliev, An Introduction to international Criminal Law and Procedure (2019, Cambridge University Press) 215
[3] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, s 2(b)
[4] Ibid (c)
[5] Ibid (e)
[6] Ibid (d)
[7] Textbook Robert Cryer, Darryl Robinson, Sergey Vasiliev, An Introduction to international Criminal Law and Procedure (2019, Cambridge University Press) 207
[8] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, s 2
[9] Robert Cryer, Darryl Robinson, Sergey Vasiliev, An Introduction to international Criminal Law and Procedure (2019, Cambridge University Press) 210 , 209, 218
Sub-chapter: Meeting the four elements -
1] Kai Ambos, ‘What does ‘intent to destroy’ in genocide mean?’ (2009) 91 (876) 834 accessed 4 December 2023
[2] ibid
[3] Ibid, 835
[4] Ibid, 847
[5] ibid
[6] Nahla Abdo, ‘The Palestine Exception, Racialization and Invisibilization: From Israel (Palestine) to North America (Turtle Island)’ (2023) 49 Critical Sociology (6), 969
[7] Ibid, 970
[8] ibid
[9] Samira Kawash, ‘Nation, Place and Placelessness: Identity, Body, And Geography in the Case of Palestine’ (2003) 40 Nar. Umjet (1), 45
[10] ibid
[11] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update no. 194’ (OCHA, 8 May 2024) <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-194> accessed 31 July 2024
[12] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update no. 58’ (OCHA, 3 December 2023) <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-58> accessed 4 December 2023
[13] ibid
[14] ibid
[15] Amnesty International, ‘Lebanon: Evidence of Israel’s unlawful use of white phosphorus in Southern Lebanon as cross-border hostilities escalate’ (Amnesty, 31 October 2023) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/lebanon-evidence-of-israels-unlawful-use-of-white-phosphorus-in-southern-lebanon-as-cross-border-hostilities-escalate/> accessed 4 December 2023
[16] Timea Spitka, National and International Civilian Protection Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (2023, Palgrave Macmillan) 36
[17] Ibid, 15
[18] Ibid, 31
[19] ibid
[20] Ibid, 54
[21] ibid
[22] Kai Ambos, ‘What does ‘intent to destroy’ in genocide mean?’ (2009) 91 (876) 837 accessed 4 December 2023
[23] Ibid, 847
Sub-Chapter: Addressing Rebuttals -
1] David Lee Preston, ‘The rising death toll in Gaza is tragic. But Holocaust scholars should know: It is not genocide.’ (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 3 November 2023) <https://www.jta.org/2023/11/03/ideas/the-rising-death-toll-in-gaza-is-tragic-but-holocaust-scholars-should-know-it-is-not-genocide> accessed 4 December 2023
[2] ibid
[3] ibid
[4] ibid
[5] Textbook Robert Cryer, Darryl Robinson, Sergey Vasiliev, An Introduction to international Criminal Law and Procedure (2019, Cambridge University Press) 220
[6] Ibid, 221
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